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CLASSIFYING RACE, RACIALIZING CLASS
FRAN ANSLEY *

In Professor Malamud's helpful and thought provoking
article,' she challenges us to consider a number of thorny issues
related to affirmative action. In this brief response, I want to
praise what I consider to be several of the most illuminating and
salutary points of Malamud's thesis, and then question others.
ADMIRATION

First, let me join wholeheartedly Professor Malamud's
warnings about the danger and shortsightedness of restricting
our own arguments "to ones that are currently acceptable to the
Court as permissible rationales."2 I agree with her reminder that
doing so would represent a failure of professional competence-a
sort of lapse into pre-Realist naivete about the nature of adjudication generally and of constitutional adjudication in particular.'
Those of us who oppose the drift of the current Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence should find ways to press what we believe to
be our best and most principled points with both ordinary people
and policymakers, large and small, in all the varied social
locations where this important question is being debated. We
should do so in part because such public dialogue is important in
its own right and in part because the climate of public opinion has
profound effects on legislative and judicial decisionmakers.
Further, in framing arguments directly to courts, we should recall
that "[a] judge will be more likely to read precedent as permitting
a broader range of action if the judge is personally convinced
there are good reasons to do so,"4 even if these good reasons are
ones that remain unstated in judicial opinions.' This is astute
Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law, and Faculty
B.A.,
Director, University of Tennessee Community Partnership Center.
Harvard/Radcliffe, 1969; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law, 1979; LL.M.,
Harvard Law School, 1988.
1. Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity,and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997).
2. Id. at 947.
3. See id. at 946-47.
4. Id. at 946.
5. Having said it is important not to be constrained in our thinking and
*
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advice, particularly apt for law school administrators and other
leaders who are called upon to explain or discuss law school
practices with various members of the public.'
A second aspect of Professor Malamud's article that I find
particularly helpful is her examination of the situation of the
black middle class.7 Precisely how to define that group--or any
other American class for that matter-is an important question
Malamud does not address.8 Nevertheless, her treatment of this
issue represents an exciting move because it productively
explores the elusive, slippery, and refractory subjects of race and
class by focusing upon a particular, concrete social formation that
implicates both.9 In the emergent vocabulary of critical race
theory, Malamud's analysis in this instance is "intersectional."'

advocacy by the strictures of Supreme Court doctrine, I must nevertheless remind
my readers that those strictures are stiff indeed. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 258.1 (1996).
6. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, PRESERVING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PROGRAMS INTHE LATE 90S (1996). This booklet, designed for decisionmakers in legal
education, takes a cautious approach to the evolving law and suggests that leaders
in legal education should do likewise. The dean of St. Mary's University School of
Law takes a livelier and less acquiescent view of recent trends. See Barbara Bader
Aldave, Hopwood v. Texas: A Victory for "Equality" That Denies Reality-An
Afterword, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 147 (1996). Another article, older but still timely in
several important ways, is Howard Lesnick, What Does Bakke Require of Law
Schools?, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1979).
7. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 967-88.
8. One instance where I find myself wanting further clarification and analysis
is Professor Malamud's juxtaposition of the "black middle class" with the "white
working class." See Malamud, supra note 1, at 993-95. How does she intend readers
to understand these terms, and why should readers accept her assumption that they
are categories that merit comparison and contrast? I should note that Malamud's
earlier work suggests that she is not unsophisticated about the difficulty and
complexity of class categories. Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative
Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1847 (1996). I hope we will see more
work from her and others on this problem as it relates to affirmative action.
9. The race/class relationship in America is notoriously deep and controversial.
See, e.g., ERIC ARNESON, WATERFRONT WORKERS OF NEW ORLEANS: RACE, CLASS, AND
POLITICS 1863-1923 (1991); RAYMOND S. FRANKLIN, SHADOWS OF RACE & CLASS
(1991); DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991). For some earlier struggles of my own to untangle

the knot see Frances Lee Ansley, Stirringthe Ashes: Race, Class and the Futureof
Civil Rights Scholarship,74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989). Angela Harris has recently
suggested that the time may be ripe for critical race theorists to approach this
subject in a more concentrated way. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The
Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 777 (1994).
10. Kimberle Crenshaw set out a well-known demonstration of the importance
of intersectionality in her article, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex:
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She looks at a social location where two significant axes of
identity intersect. In the process, she questions and, in turn,
enriches our normal, "non-intersectional" understanding of each
axis as it is conceived in isolation."
Intersectional analysis points out the obvious-that actual
identity categories never exist in isolation. For instance, every
person belongs to a certain socioeconomic class, but in a highly
racialized economy like our own, that class is always "raced." It
does not stand alone. Similarly, each person has a racial identity
within this society (even if it is a hybrid or. otherwise complex or
contested one), but that person's race is always "gendered."
The more powerful the intersecting social category, of course,
the more powerful its effect in reciprocally altering the nature of
other categories that it intersects. There is no such thing as pure
womanhood that can exist apart from, say, white womanhood or
black womanhood. The very way that a man is male is profoundly
influenced by whether he is a white male or a male of color. The
very way that a black person is black is profoundly influenced by
whether that person is a man or a woman. The intersectional
approach cautions us to bring these relationships to light and to
consciously interrogate relevant intersections. We should do this
not only to learn what the intersections' particular relational
energies may have to teach us about the respective categories in
question, but also to ensure that we have not falsely deduced
sameness when two categories share one axis of commonality.
Such a deduction can be particularly dangerous when an axis of
commonality spans a social distance between other categories as
as, say, class, race, or gender is in U.S. society today.
potent
Malamud's
paper is a contribution to intersectional thinking
in that she highlights specific ways in which a "middle-class"
person's situation is likely to be significantly affected by the

A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory, and
AntiracistPolitics, 1989 U. CHI.LEGAL F. 139. She observed, for instance, that at the
intersection of race and gender, women of color (the subordinate pole of both
operative categories) are often erased. See id. at 150-52. Unconscious assumptions
that all the women are white and all the people of color are males can lead-even in
the midst of antidiscrimination efforts-to the creation of legal doctrines that
reinscribe hierarchy within each of the intersecting categories. See id. at 139, 160
(citing ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLAcKs ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE
BRAVE (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982))
11. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 967-88.

1004

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

person's race. 2 Using concrete markers developed in the social
science literature, Malamud shows us that the "white middle
class" and the "black middle class" are not in fact the same-even
in "class" terms. 3 She then argues--quite appropriately, I
believe-that this difference provides one important justification
for affirmative action programs that purposefully benefit members of the black middle class. This difference challenges the idea
that awarding a law school place to the proverbial black neurosurgeon's child is, on its face, illegitimate. In fact, it is neither a
perversion of the equality aims of affirmative action, nor a cause
for embarrassment to the administrators of affirmative action
programs, nor a reason for the recipient of such a slot to feel
shame or guilt about an "undeserved" benefit having been
conferred upon him at the expense of another equally or more
worthy applicant.
APPREHENSION

Having praised these important virtues of Professor Malamud's paper, however, I turn now to some criticisms. The things
that worry me most about Professor Malamud's remarks lie
somewhat below the surface, so I may be reading them inaccurately. In any event, I think they are worth a second look.
WHO

IS THE AUDIENCE?

First, I want to object to Professor Malamud's implicit claim
of representing "those who must be convinced" about the value of
affirmative action programs based upon race. In the concluding
portion of her article she states, "I sense that I am fairly representative of the portion of liberal and moderate America on whose
court the battle for affirmative action in America must be
fought."'4 She goes on to draw an implicit contrast between her
group and a shadowy set of others, others who are apparently
well-intentioned but wed to affirmative action in ways that
Malamud sees as problematic for their own best aims. This
implied contrast suggests a strong dichotomy between policy
12. See id. at 966-69. For a related point, see Martin Carnoy & Richard
Rothstein, Are Black Diplomas Worth Less?, AM. PROSPECT, Jan-Feb. 1997, at 42.
13. See Malamud, supra note 1,at 969-88.
14. Id. at 997.
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argument and personal identity, reason and passion, mind and
body:
We [those on whose court the battle must be fought] are people
for whom the issue of affirmative action is important but not
to the point of being constitutive of our political and moral
identity. I once confessed to a colleague... that I tend not to
participate in legal debates on abortion because the "me" that
is having the debate could not have been having the debate if
abortion rights had not been secure when I needed them. I
know what it means to have a core belief that is not amenable
to the ordinary techniques of political and intellectual persuasion. But on the issue of affirmative action, I am part of a
large and politically important group of people of all races in
this country for whom the issue is not presently constitutive
in this sense. We are people in need of good arguments ....
I view both the need for and the justice of race-based
affirmative action on behalf of the black middle class as
legitimately contestable. This means that I must identify the
weaknesses in what currently pass as the "best" arguments
and seek to make better ones with the hope they can persuade
those of my kind who have not yet crossed over to a moral and
political space in which arguments no longer matter.15
It is not entirely clear to me what Malamud is suggesting in
this passage. She may be saying that she and the group she
invokes represent an assemblage of cool heads who are admirably
dispassionate and therefore should prevail. Alternatively, she
may be saying that she and the group she invokes represent an
assemblage of social power that must be reckoned with because
it will prevail. In either event, I take exception.
I agree that the social position from which Professor Malamud speaks-that of a white professional, an intellectual, a
teacher at an elite university-is an important one insofar as
molding and expressing American public opinion and developing
American social policy are concerned. Further, she is no doubt
correct in implying that there are many people with important
influence in the polity who, like her, are not entirely certain what
they think about affirmative action. I concur in the judgment
that less ambivalent proponents of affirmative action should
engage such persons in a respectful dialogue. Their decisions on
affirmative action may ultimately make a difference.

15. Id.
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But I also believe that her approach wrongly demands a lion's
share of the intellectual and political attention of affirmative
action proponents, and wrongly advises them as to whose
perspective should be presumed to fill the judgment seat. In my
own view, a more pressing and difficult imperative for affirmative
action advocates who conceive of their goal as racial justice is to
look to those "on the bottom" for our most important potential
partners. Doing so will require us to seek beyond close and
comfortable circles of presently left-leaning and color-embracing
friends; I suspect that this point was one of Professor Malamud's
intended messages, and it is one well-taken. But such a move
will also entail looking beyond Malamud's audience of distanced
reasoners, with its hint of academia, its self-announced centrism,
and its implicit claim to a status above the messy fray.
As an initial matter, I dispute her claim of distance from the
fray. For instance, the debate over affirmative action is inextricably bound to questions about the system of standardized testing
that defines merit within the educational system and within
many parts of the labor market. No American academic can, with
a straight face, claim to enjoy a safe distance from the current
system of standardized testing and other academic examination,
from this all-powerful sorting mechanism for "meritocracy" as it
presently exists. It is precisely my impression that many
beneficiaries of standardized tests and examination procedures
believe in the value and objectivity of such tests with a conviction
that is "constitutive" of their vocational and personal identities,
a conviction "that is not amenable to the ordinary techniques of
political and intellectual persuasion."' 6 Failing to recognize that
relative winners in the current so-called merit system have a
thoroughly established stake in the rules that reward them for
their combined effort and unearned privilege will hardly lead to
a clear understanding of these issues. 7

16. Id.
17. In recent years, assorted groups and individuals'have begun to articulate
a long-overdue critical analysis of the regnant "testocracy." See, e.g., Lani Guinier
& Susan Sturm, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,
84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency and
the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995). But they have yet to
develop a blueprint for alternative ways of discerning and enhancing relevant
potential, achievement, and progress, all of which are important tasks.
I agree with Professor Malamud's concern that in the face of a demonstrable gap
between the performance of blacks and whites on traditional merit criteria, it is
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Second, I dispute the notion that racial justice can best be
attained through a focus on reasoning with those in positions of
social privilege and on persuading them to share that privilege
more equitably through appeal to good arguments. Do not
misunderstand me: I believe in the struggle to find and to widely
communicate "good" arguments. I am an inveterate modernist in
this respect.18 But I also believe in the wisdom of Frederick
Douglass's famous admonition that power concedes nothing
without a struggle. 9 Therefore, I conclude that it behooves
wrong "to treat the gap as normal or natural, as something to be expected."
Malamud, supra note 1, at 955. Instead, I believe the persistent gap suggests two
sorts of conclusions.
First, persistent racial disparities on standardized tests should warn us to
distrust the tests themselves. In my view, such disparities indicate three things. (1)
There are racial defects in the ability of such tests to accurately measure aptitude.
These defects should be strictly and creatively analyzed. See, e.g., Leslie G.
Espinoza, The LSAT." Narrativesand Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121 (1993). (2)
There are racial dangers in overrelying on such tests. These dangers should be
anticipated and guarded against by responsible decisionmakers. See LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSION COUNCIL, CAUTIONARY POLICIES CONCERNING LSAT SCORES AND RELATED

SERVICES (1996). (3) There are problems of general fairness and efficacy associated
with such tests that can work to exclude many individuals of all races from
opportunities they deserve. These problems hurt the larger community by
constructing an educational system that regularly overlooks and excludes people
with capacities that are crucial to problem-solving and to leadership, and therefore
to the civic health and well-being of society as a whole. For a table displaying the
striking correspondence between SAT scores and family income, see RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 99 (1996).

Second, however, persistent racial disparities indicate that many of those who
do poorly on the tests are carrying a burden of educational deprivation and miseducation. Malamud is right that affirmative action proponents should not lose sight
of this sorry fact in their efforts to challenge the effectiveness and legitimacy of
current indicators of "merit." Malamud, supra note 1, at 955-56. Sorting out the
salient lesson for each situation is no small challenge.
18. On the modernism point, see Harris, supra note 9, at 750-54.
19. Douglass made this remark in a speech delivered at an event
commemorating the twenty-third anniversary of emancipation in the West Indies,
several months after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Dred Scott. The
surrounding passage is as follows:
The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all
concessions yet made to her august claims, have been born of earnest
struggle ....
If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who
profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want
crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder
and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many
waters.
This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it
may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power
concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find
out just what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out
the exact measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon

1008

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

affirmative action proponents seeking racial justice to develop
good arguments and then to discuss and debate them, not only in
the halls of privilege and power but also .and especially with
strategic allies who share a stake in a more just, open, and lifesustaining system of education and employment.2 ° Those most
likely to be effective strategic allies for the democratization of
education and for more equitable access to livelihood for those
who have traditionally been shut out will be found among the
disenfranchised. They will represent all races, despite the
certainty of multi-class white resistance to racial change and
fractures among and between communities of color. They will be
divided and confused. They will have much to teach academics
who venture forth to find them. They, like the academics, will
have bodies and feelings in addition to heads and reasons, and
although Malamud hints otherwise, neither they nor we academics should take our embodiment as a disability or a reason for
recusal from the dialogue.
In my own work, I have been striving to find or to help create
arenas where people who are most directly affected by policy
decisions can come face-to-face with each other and can move to
intervene in corporate and government policy as well. For
instance, I am interested in learning from and with the Appalachian coal miners who seem to sympathetically litter academic
and media conversations when the topic is race-conscious
affirmative action, but who virtually disappear when the topic is
labor law reform, cuts in subsidized housing, capital flight, or Pell
grants. Similarly, I have been searching for venues where

them, and these will continue till they are resisted with either words or
blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the
endurance of those whom they oppress.
Frederick Douglass, West India Emancipation, in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850-1860, at 426, 437 (Philip S.
Foner ed., 1950) (speech delivered at Canadaigua, New York, Aug. 4, 1857).
20. A recent effort that laudably addresses itself to an audience beyond
academic and legal circles is CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE
WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997). This eloquent
and moving book combines analytic and narrative argument, communicated from the
heart and in the authors' "own" voices. It makes complex and nuanced points while
remaining open and accessible to a wide readership. Of course, even a work of this
kind will by definition be restricted in its reach to readers of books. For a call to
critical race scholars to become more involved in change-oriented litigation and
community lawyering, see Eric K. Yamamoto, CriticalRace Praxis: Race Theory and
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821
(1997).
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Appalachian factory workers can meet their new neighbors from
Mexico and Guatemala, or collaborate with African American
fellow citizens in nearby cities, for venues where these players
can learn from each other about mixed histories of race and class,
of cultural and economic injustice, and of strategies for resistance
and survival. 2 '
I hardly need to make explicit that these efforts are but a
start, that they face significant obstacles and countercurrents,
that a powerful cross-race, bottom-up coalition for education and
employment equity is not on the immediate horizon. But I urge
readers to think twice before they accept what I hear to be
Professor Malamud's assumption-perhaps an assumption she
herself would be willing to qualify-about what audiences,
informants, scholars, and advocates should be holding uppermost
in their minds as they frame and deliver their arguments,2 2

21. Some traces of this work are discernable in Fran Ansley, The Gulf of Mexico,
the Academy, and Me, 78 SOUNDINGS 68 (1995); Frances Lee Ansley, North American
Free Trade Agreement: The Public Debate, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329 (1992);
Frances Lee Ansley, U.S.-Mexico Free Trade from the Bottom: A Postcardfrom the
Border, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (1992); Fran Ansley et al., An Interview with Tom
Lowry, 1 SOUTHERN EXPOSURE, Winter 1974, at 137; Fran Ansley & Brenda Bell,
Davidson-Wilder 1932: Strikes in the Coal Camps, 1 SOUTHERN EXPOSURE, Winter
1974, at 113; Fran Ansley & Brenda Bell, Miners Insurrections/ConvictLabor, 1
SOUTHERN EXPOSURE, Winter 1974, at 144 (based, in part, on oral testimony of coal
miners gathered by Jim Dombrowski in Tennessee in the 1930s); Fran Ansley &
John Gaventa, Researchingfor Democracy and DemocratizingResearch, CHANGE,
Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 46 (part of a symposium issue on "Higher Education and
Rebuilding Civic Life"); Fran Ansley & Susan Williams, Southern Women and
Southern Borders on the Move: Tennessee Workers Explore the New International
Division of Labor, in CHAINS OF IRON, CHAINS OF GOLD: WOMEN AND THE SOUTHERN

EXPERIENCE (Barbara Smith ed., forthcoming); Jim Sessions & Fran Ansley, Singing
Across Dark Spaces: The Union/Community Takeover of Pittston'sMoss 3 Plant,in
Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of Resistance & Change 195 (Stephen L.
Fisher ed., 1992), reprinted in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(Staughton Lynd & Alice Lynd eds., rev. ed., 1995).
22. Legal scholars committed to social justice should explore non-academic
venues for dialogue and argument, places where they can reach and be reached by
a constituency that lacks the social privilege that characterizes most of our
readership and too many of our classrooms. These might include op-ed articles in
mainstream and community newspapers; interviews for local television and radio;
speeches at conferences, rallies and demonstrations; writing and producing leaflets,
brochures, slide shows, comic books, films, and videos. Such work might include
teaching and curriculum development in educational programs put on by labor
unions, legal services groups, churches or community organizations, or in K-12
classes, citizenship schools, or adult basic education settings such as literacy and
high school equivalency programs, or courses in English for Speakers of a Second
Language. Tenure and promotion committees should look for this type of democracybuilding, anti-elitist scholarship in the tenure and promotion files of faculty

1010

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

assemble their evidence, search for collaborators," check their
perspectives, and develop sources they deem to be trustworthy
and well-informed. I urge all of us to think twice before we
presume we know where the power to bring change actually
resides.24
WHAT ARE THE RATIONALES?

My second criticism of Professor Malamud's remarks relates
more directly to the substance of her argument, particularly the
choice it poses between justice and diversity goals. Professor
Malamud organizes her article around a discussion of two
different rationales for affirmative action. One she refers to as
the "economic inequality" rationale,25 the "economic case,"2 or
sometimes as one based on "social justice."27 The other she refers
to as the "diversity" rationale.28 She presents these two as a

candidates and should reward excellence in these spheres as they do in narrower and
more elite ones.
23. The search for non-academic collaborators can be a rewarding one. In
recent years, scholars, teachers, community developers, and activists around the
country have begun to create some space for cross-race and cross-class collaboration
between institutions of higher education and their neighboring communities. This
fledgling collaboration has attendant difficulties, however, given the often troubled
histories of distrust and exploitation that too frequently exist between universitybased experts and "locals." Nevertheless, some guidance as to the best practices has
begun to emerge. See, e.g., BUILDING COMMUNITY: SOCIAL SCIENCE IN ACTION (Philip

Nyden et al. eds., 1997); Ken Reardon & Thomas P. Shields, Here They Come Again!
Campus/Community Partnershipsin the 90s, PLANNERS NETWORK, Mar. 1996, at 1.
24. Some sources that have recently reinforced my conviction that change
toward greater democracy must (and can) come from below include: ACTION AND
KNOWLEDGE: BREAKING THE MONOPOLY WITH PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH
(Orlando Fals-Borda & Muhammad Anisur Rahman eds., 1991); HENRY J. FRUNDT,
REFRESHING PAUSES: COCA-COLA AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA (1987); MARY
ANN HINSDALE ET AL., IT COMES FROM THE PEOPLE: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND
LOCAL THEOLOGY (1995); MYLES HORTON, THE LONG HAUL (1990); MYLES HORTON &
PAULO FREIRE, WE MAKE THE ROAD BY WALKING: CONVERSATIONS ON EDUCATION
AND SOCIAL CHANGE (John Gaventa et al. eds., 1991); READY FROM WITHIN: SEPTIMA
CLARK AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A FIRST PERSON NARRATIVE (Cynthia
Stokes Brown ed., 1990); VOICES OF CHANGE: PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Peter Park et al. eds., 1993); 'WEARE ALL LEADERS":
THE ALTERNATIVE UNIONISM OF THE EARLY 1930S (Staughton Lynd ed., 1996).

25. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 939-40, 966, 990.
26. Id. at 988.
27. See id. at 966.
28. See id. at 941 and passim. At several junctures, Malamud also refers to the
diversity rationale as a "utility" argument. See id. at 953, 958, 996.
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polarity, associating the social justice rationale with "redress"29
for past and present wrongs in contrast to the diversity rationale,
which, she says, "is not by its terms based on the existence of
Further, she asserts that proponents of
discrimination."3 0
affirmative action have endorsed diversity and all but abandoned
social justice as a rationale for affirmative action. ("Supporters
of race-based affirmative action, particularly in the sphere of
education, [claim] (implicitly or explicitly) that economic inequality is not, in fact, the reason for race-based affirmative action ....
Instead they embrace diversity as affirmative action's central goal
,31)
She then goes on to argue that the socioeconomic
...
justification for affirmative action is superior to the diversity
justification or at least that diversity, standing alone, is an
insufficient justification for affirmative action programs on their
present scale.
Malamud's dichotomy between "social justice" and diversity
is helpful in some ways, but in the final analysis, it overstates the
case. First, the two rationales are not so clearly opposed as she
suggests; in practice, the diversity rationale is often closely
intertwined with concerns about socioeconomic inequality and
social justice. Second, she poses these alternatives as if they
alone occupy the field, when, in reality, a number of other
important justifications often accompany affirmative action
policy, either explicitly or implicitly. An analysis that ignores
these justifications may well fail to account for other equally
important aims and values at work in this area of law and social
policy, including aims and values that might help us think about
affirmative action and the black middle class.
Certainly Malamud is right to point out the relative weakness of any "pure" diversity rationale-its inability to explain why
race should be, as it is at least in some institutions, the "only
diversification goal," 2 or even why it should be treated as
demonstrably among the most important of such goals. Diversity
as an abstract concept is vulnerable to a kind of emptiness; it can
be drained of all content related to substantive justice, so
Malamud is right to point out that affirmative action proponents

29. See id. at 940 ("redress"), and 941 ("remedying of past or present societal
discrimination).
30. Id. at 953-54.
31. Id. at 939.
32. Id. at 960.
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who embrace too easily or too exclusively a thin version of
diversity will leave themselves on shaky ground.
In practice, however, the two approaches are not as diametrically opposed as Malamud would have it. Actual affirmative
action programs around the country-despite the fact that they
are almost always couched in terms of diversity-also show
unmistakable evidence of concern over redress of past wrongs and
reduction of present racial disparities.
While it is true that a more racially heterogeneous student
body, teacher corps, or workforce benefits all members of the
relevant institutions and even society at large, the benefit results
largely because the history and continued legacy and regular
renewal of injustice makes race such a salient category in
America. Accordingly, Professor Malamud may be setting up
something of a strawman in the way she frames her argument.
On rare occasions, someone does invoke a "sole" or "pure"
diversity rationale divorced from any roots in past or present
injustice. For instance, once or twice a colleague has pointed out
to me that he perceives a contradiction in my alleged devotion to
diversity because I do not expend great energy trying to recruit a
rich and varied assortment of conservative students or scholars
into legal academia. I have conceded readily enough the lack of
effort, but I have reminded such critics that I also refrain from
expending great (or any) effort to achieve diverse faculty eye color
or shoe size, or to seek out speakers of Hungarian for our
administrative staff, or to expand the number of different
birthdays represented by the members of the faculty or student
body, or to recruit someone in an irreversible coma to teach
bankruptcy next year.
Of course, diversity of political views on a law faculty or in a
law school student body is more important than shoe size or
speaking Hungarian at the University of Tennessee; thus, it
merits some faculty attention and support. But I do not believe
that recruiting more faculty with a sharper or more idiosyncratic
edge to their conservatism should be accorded anything remotely
like the priority we should give to desegregating professional
education in this country. My conviction on this score is, of
course, rooted in my sense of the country's social history and
present needs. No hiring or admissions choice can be coherently
or honestly defended or resolved with reference to a purely formal
diversity ideal because gatekeepers with finite resources will
-always be choosing among various kinds of diversity.
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To the extent that proponents of affirmative action or those
responsible for administering affirmative action programs have
allowed themselves to rely on easy diversity formalism, they have
done a disservice, and Professor Malamud is right to point out the
inadequacy of such approaches.
Nevertheless, the bipolar
framework that she suggests underestimates the variety and
strength of the values bundled into the current diversity movement.
Actual diversity practice in educational institutions and
workplaces around the country suggests that most practitioners
pay more attention to race and other categories associated with
strong histories of exclusion and inequality than they do to other
sorts of categories, despite the controversy that color-conscious
programs tend to produce. The marks of an understanding that
race matters more than most other kinds of diversity are manifest. In my view, this is precisely as it should be: widespread
racial disparities in wealth and power and access to the legal
system should be both a motivation for and a target of affirmative
action programs. Racial diversity should be one of the most
important of the several kinds of diversity that we work to
achieve. Thus, my point is not to criticize, but simply to highlight
the undeniable priority accorded to race in most affirmative
action programs, however ill-designed and weakly defended that
priority may be. This recurrent priority suggests that "pure
diversity" divorced from social justice is not in fact the salient
operative category.
I think that a tacit understanding is pervasive among those
of all stripes who advocate both weak and strong diversity
programs. No matter how saccharin or happy-faced the diversity
pronouncements, no matter how cloying the rainbow tunes, if you
look at diversity programs in action, it is perfectly clear that their
proponents believe that some kinds of diversity are more important than others and that, like it or not, race is at or near the top
of the list.
I do not mean to suggest that most institutions publicly
evidence this understanding or volunteer to defend it. For a
number of reasons-frequently including, as Malamud points out,
an understandable desire to stay safely within the confines of
Supreme Court doctrine3Z-many institutions studiously avoid

33. See id. at 946-47.
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any overt discussion of taking race any more seriously than other
categories of difference.3 4 But I believe that many existing
affirmative action programs give race a priority because those
who shape these programs have a strong sense that past and
present socioeconomic discrimination is real, that this past and
present discrimination makes racial diversity particularly salient,
and that the situation calls for action. To that extent, I believe it
is inaccurate to describe current practice as having abandoned
discrimination-related goals for diversity ones. Of course,
affirmative action practitioners can and do differ sharply about
the appropriate response to past and present discrimination.
Some such practitioners are probably more accurately described
as seeking peace than seeking justice. Nevertheless, existing
practices indicate that the poles of Professor Malamud's suggested polarity are not so distinct.
Further, race is sometimes given a priority in such programs
for reasons that are not adequately captured by either pole of
Malamud's proffered choice. Framing the contest in terms of
diversity versus socioeconomic equality fails to help us unpack
and assess the policies and value choices that are actually at work
in many affirmative action initiatives.
In the section that follows, I discuss some of the substantive
aims and values that have animated the theory and practice of
existing affirmative action programs. I take up Professor Malamud's suggestion that "it is better to bring the social justice
norms underlying the debate to the surface," 5 but I add a second
goal of surfacing other norms that may be at work as well. Not
all defenders or practitioners of affirmative action endorse all of
the following norms and values, as will no doubt be apparent.
But all of these values are at least often enough at work that they
merit examination.
1. Compensatingfor Past Wrongs. Whether tacitly or openly,
this value is often at work in affirmative action practice. Some
participants in the conversation heartily endorse this value.3

34. See generally LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, supra note 6.
35. Malamud, supra note 1, at 964.
36. See, e.g., LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 20, at 231-44. In a similarly
history-conscious vein, T. Alexander Aleinikoff writes:
When a city council attempts to overcome some of its city's history, to
move toward erasing the gross disparity in grant awards by directing
funds towards a group singled out and subordinated because of its race
for almost four hundred years, to provide the means by which African-

1997]

CLASSIFYING RACE, RACIALIZING CLASS

1015

Others deny that it is an appropriate or helpful priority.17 The
history of the United States certainly makes the compensation
rationale a hard one to escape entirely, even for those who are
hostile to it. We are, after all, a nation born of violent colonization, one where the great bulk of the land was expropriated by
force from indigenous peoples, 8 where chattel slavery once was
widespread and critical to the national economy, 9 where legally
tolerated (sometimes even legally enforced) racial inequality has
often been the norm in such basic areas of life as education,40
shelter,4 ' transportation,4 2 citizenship,43 immigration,4 4 law
enforcement,48 literacy,46 the franchise,4 7 employment,48 and

Americans can begin the economic development promised but denied
during Reconstruction, to say to blacks that the city recognizes the harms
inflicted on blacks as blacks by white supremacy and white economic and
political power, how should race discrimination law respond?
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,
1075 (1991).
37. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOuzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY (1995); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discriminationand
Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEx. L. REV. 993 (1993).
38. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The
Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative
Traditionsof FederalIndian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989); Rennard Strickland,
Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American
Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986).
39. See, e.g., CHARLES W. BERGQUIST, LABOR AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN
HISTORY IN LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE (1996).
DEMOCRACY:
40. See, U.S.
e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
41. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanon v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917).
42. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For news of a
contemporary challenge to the racialized character of the transportation system in
today's Los Angeles, see, ERIC MANN, A NEW VISION FOR URBAN TRANSPORTATION:
THE BUS RIDERS UNION MAKES HISTORY AT THE INTERSECTION OF MASS TRANSIT,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996) (available from the Labor/Community

Strategy Center, Los Angeles); David Bloom, MTA Endorses Settlement in Civil
Rights Suit: Deal Would Aid Transit Dependent, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 1996,
at N4.
43. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); IAN F. HANEY LPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OFRACE (1996).

44. See, e.g., Law of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) (Chinese
Exclusion Act); Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952)
(Japanese Exclusion Act).
45. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottroll, Outlawing Outcasts: Comparative Perspectives
on the Differing Functions of the Criminal Law of Slavery in the Americas, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 717 (1996).. See generally Symposium, CriminalLaw, Criminal
Justice,and Race, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1725 (1993).
46. See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE

1016

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

otherwise.49 These aspects of our past are often repressed or
elided. Nevertheless, the memory of a legally and extra-legally
racialized past endures in many instances, and its memory
informs and motivates affirmative action practice.5"
The problem with the often tacit compensatory rationale at
work in affirmative action practice is not its absence, but its lack
of self-confidence whenever it ventures beyond the bounds of an
individualist approach to remediation. Affirmative action
doctrine has for the most part been unable to overcome the strong
individualist bent of our legal culture and, therefore, has been
unable to provide frank, thoughtful, and enthusiastic support for
group remedies to compensate for the infliction of group wrongs.5
Although racial caste systems obviously have a huge effect on
individuals, they also work in profoundly important ways upon
and through racial groups. Wrongs inflicted on persons of color
have a way of spilling over from one individual to another, as
stereotyped assumptions about all group members work their way
into majority decisions and judgments. Moreover, just as the
effects of racial deprivation and racial privilege are transmitted
within families across generations, they are also amplified within
the boundaries of racialized neighborhoods.
For instance,
children born into racial minority groups experience the cumulative effects of macro- and micro-level discrimination5 2 before they

ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 208 (1975).

47. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN &
ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1995); LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH
OF SLAVERY 74-79 (1961).
48. See, e.g., HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

(1977); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and
the Supreme Court: A Reform Programfor Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REV.
241 (1994).
49. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed.,
1980); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE

AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS:

THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); ARNOLD KRUPAT,

ETHNOCRITICISM: ETHNOGRAPHY, HISTORY, LITERATURE (1992).

50. This memory may, of course, be conscious or repressed, and may produce
the acceptance or denial of responsibility for change. See STEPHEN STEINBERG,
TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND

POLICY 156-175 (1995).
51. I do not mean to imply that some proponents of affirmative action have not
tried-eloquently-to highlight the group aspect of both the original wrong and the
rightful remedy. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:
Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV.L. REV. 525 (1990); see also Staughton
Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984).
52. Professor Davis has written tellingly about the concept of racial "micro-
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are even in a position to have an interaction likely to fit into any
category of easily cognizable individual legal harm. Concomitantly, children born (as I was) into whiteness experience the
cumulative effect of racial privilege, often in ways they are not
even in a position to see.5 3
To be sure, in a narrow line of cases, racial wrongs have been
coherently and effectively traced and attributed to individual
perpetrators by individual victims. By identifying the perpetrators, victims can in some instances convincingly demonstrate
their resulting entitlement to individual compensation for the
resulting harm. 4 But this approach cannot even reveal, much

aggression." See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microagression,98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989).
53. See PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN'S

STUDIES (Wellesley College Center for Research on Women Working Paper No. 189,
1988); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See" White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993). For a review
of some recent literature on the problem of unconscious discriminatory attitudes and
beliefs in America, see David Benjamin Oppenheimer, UnderstandingAffirmative
Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 946-958 (1996).
54. From my law school days in the mid-1970s, I recall a series of labor law and
discrimination cases where courts ordered awards to individuals who had been
personally turned away by hiring officers during an era of explicit exclusion. These
indisputable victims were awarded constructive seniority that dated back to the time
of their wrongful exclusion, an award whose goal was to restore them to the place
they would have been "but for" the wrongful discrimination. These plaintiffs had
been individually wronged in an interaction where racial exclusion was overt, the
corporate perpetrator was still alive and well and doing business in the victim's
hometown, and it was quite feasible and neat to make the plaintiffs individually
whole, at least on some important parameters, through an award of back pay and
constructive seniority.
Similarly, we saw cases where previously separate seniority lists for black and
white jobs were ordered by courts to be dovetailed, thus allowing black employees to
use their time in formerly black positions to bid successfully on jobs that had
previously been reserved for whites only. Since they had been working for the same
employer all along, their seniority did not even have to be "constructed." It had only
to be integrated with the white lists. The white incumbent employees may not have
been happy, since they were being subjected to competition not faced before, but the
individual wrong and the individual benefit were satisfyingly linked.
Today, of course, it is increasingly difficult to find cases where this sort of
individual moment of illegitimate exclusion can be proven and pinpointed in time,
and where institutional structures exist that could support make-whole remedies.
I question the present efficacy of the remedies granted to the individual plaintiffs in
these old lawsuits. I now wonder what happened to the factories in these cases: Did
they institute standardized testing to determine who was worthy of promotion? Did
they spin off the dirty jobs to sub-contractors, thus splitting the seniority lists once
more? Does seniority even continue to function as a criterion if a union no longer
represents their workforce? Did they close down altogether? Did they start hiring
their low-skill workers through a temporary agency? Did they automate many
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less remedy, most of the practices that actually carry forward the
existing structures and distributions of racial caste in our society.
If the legal system were to take a more conscious and
attentive account of the group nature of many of the harms of
racial caste, then it could more coherently and confidently insist
upon the appropriateness of compensatory affirmative action
remedies that promise to effectively compensate minority groups.
Of course, such an approach would not rule out affirmative action
remedies aimed at compensating those individual racial wrongs
that could be documented and proven. At least some persons who
have suffered personally targeted racial discrimination could still,
through individual remedies, be given opportunities that would
likely have been theirs but for racial discrimination.
However, the approach I am suggesting would do more. It
might, for instance, seek out and train persons with a strong
interest in providing services to communities of color that are
presently underserved as a result of past and present racial
conditions. Or it might make special efforts to attract and
nurture researchers, writers, and artists dedicated to anti-racist
scholarly and creative production.55 Or it might recruit persons
with a demonstrated capacity to mobilize various kinds of efforts
directed against racial caste structures that carry forward and
reproduce the effects of past racial wrongs. The rationale for such
remedies would still be justice-related, as Professor Malamud
counsels it should be, but the rationale would put primary
emphasis on compensating the wronged community, rather than
solely searching for compensation-worthy individuals." Single

functions and then lay off half the workforce, keeping mostly those who were trained
to operate computers? Did they move the labor-intensive product lines off shore?
55. See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural PluralistCase for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705. But see Richard A. Posner, Comment: Duncan
Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157.
56. Professor Malamud does not take up this question in a focused way, but I
suspect she would be concerned about the impact on individuals of an affirmative
action remedy that would in some sense burden its individual recipients with a
responsibility to carry out an important part of the scheme of redress. I note, for
instance, her worry over the reinforcement of racially identifiable service-related
occupational niches, see Malamud supra note 1, at 962-63, her characterization of the
anti-academic pull of racial solidarity upon African American students as a
"temptation," see id. at 980, her view that "[a]U things being equal, members of
minority groups would far prefer to be hired for their general abilities, rather than
for their particular ability to be a member of a minority group," id. at 964. The
tension reflected in these concerns is, of course, always potentially present.
Groupness poses a threat that may be finally irreducible. So does isolation.

1997]

CLASSIFYING RACE, RACIALIZING CLASS

1019

recipients of such redistributive benefits, for instance, might be
persons of color or they might be white. They might be poor or
they might be affluent. They might have encountered and been
able to document discrete instances of overt discrimination that
inflicted demonstrable socioeconomic harm upon them as
individuals, or they might not. While their status as victims of
socioeconomic or other racial wrongs would be relevant, its
relevance would reside in important part in the ways that status
might or might not strengthen their effectiveness for the compensatory task at hand."

57. I am certain that some people would argue that an important part of
remedying past racial wrongs in education would be simply to "let racial minorities
be." Their instructions to affirmative action practitioners might go something like
this: "Let your admittees be normal! Let them be shy. Let them be apolitical. Let
them get rich on Wall Street if they can. Let them not care about racism if they don't
want to. Respect their own path whatever that may be. And certainly don't use
minority students to gratify your own instrumentalist urges." Some argue that this
approach is a good one not only because it eliminates coercion of the individuals
involved, but also because it actually advances utilitarian goals as well: the simple
presence of individuals of color among the educated or otherwise privileged and
competent will have a tonic effect upon everyone else's stereotypes and thereby
redound to the benefit of other people of color and society as a whole.
I am certainly open to these arguments. No matter what the criteria for
admission to law school, for instance, students, once admitted, will and must be
allowed to grow and change. And as Professor Malamud cogently observes,
institutions that hire people of color should avoid silently tacking onto each such
person's job description or performance goals an unexamined and often
uncompensated "additional job of specializing in white-minority relations."
Malamud, supra note 1, at 962. But the notion that we can count upon substantial
racial justice or even a significant reduction in prejudice to trickle down or radiate
outward from the accomplishments of individuals of color is an insult to multiple
generations of extraordinary non-white achievers in our country's past. Further, the
idea that affirmative action is or should be nothing more than an engine of individual
upward mobility into the existing system is a short-sighted degradation of more farreaching goals that helped give birth to affirmative action in the first place.
Schools and organizations working to desegregate must respect individual
aspirations and should avoid institutionalizing new orthodoxies of career path or
belief to be imposed upon students or employees of color. But a straightforward and
direct effort aimed at healing and restoring injured communities is a more ethically
defensible and practically effective approach to current inequities and past wrongs
than one that aims only at changing the colors of the faces in existing structures in
the hope that racial justice will somehow arise as a natural by-product of such an
effort.
Further, the argument that race-conscious affirmative action programs can
meaningfully respond to the realities that brought them into being if they simply
assure a more diverse blend of colors and ethnicities and then "let them be" is naive.
Existing institutions are not neutral. Teacher populations, advising systems, and
management teams; curricula and reading lists; labor markets and referral
networks; patterns of delivery of professional and other services; and access to
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Whatever the strength or weakness of justice rationales in
affirmative action doctrine and practice, and whatever the degree
of explicitness about the role they play, there are a number of
other justifications at work as well. The following sections briefly
highlight some of these other themes and thereby complicate the
polarity offered by Professor Malamud in her article.
2. Adjusting to Counteract Present Bias. Many times affirmative action programs are justified as a corrective for the
continued bias that can be demonstrated almost at will in most
domestic markets by any reasonably capable and well-funded
empiricist interested in the task.58 It is true that there is
widespread denial am6ng white people about the continued
prevalence of racial bias. I also believe that, paradoxically, there
is widespread recognition that racial bias continues. Both the
forces of denial and the forces of uncomfortable certainty are
strong.59 Both make themselves felt in affirmative action policy
and discourse.

capital are all thoroughly affected by race and tend to carry forward existing racial
distributions and ways of doing business. People of color admitted or hired into
schools and workplaces will not be racially "left alone" in any case. Nor will whites.
58. A widely recognized article describing this phenomenon in the retail
automobile market is Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender and Race Discriminationin
Retail CarNegotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817 (1991). See also Oppenheimer, supra
note 53, at 958-996.
59. Recently, an article appeared in my hometown newspaper displaying a
particularly intense eruption of "recognition-denial syndrome":
Angry calls inundated a Knoxville television station and restaurant
Thursday after a racial slur was uttered during a live broadcast at the
eatery.
"Alive at Five" hosts ... apologized twice on the air after the slur ....
[The] co-owner of the restaurant... also apologized repeatedly for the
comment made on the air by his mother ... who is white. The racial
epithet was made by the ... woman to [the newscaster], who is white,
during a discussion about food preparations.
"I'm embarrassed and shocked," [the co-owner] said. 'We don't talk
like that. I extend my sincerest apologies to anybody who heard it or
heard of it because it is offensive."
Don Jacobs, Racial Slur During TV Broadcast Stirs Calls, KNOXVILLE NEWSSENTINEL, Mar. 21, 1997, at A3.
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3. Equitably DistributingResources Vital to Survival and
Participation. In an earlier version of Professor Malamud's
article she set up the competing polar rationales for affirmative
action as "compensation" versus "diversity." In her current usage,
I take it that she means to include in the "social justice" or
"socioeconomic inequality" rationale both compensatory and
presently redistributive justifications."0 I agree that wrongs and
disparities of both past and present are important justifications
for affirmative action. I separate them here because in the
current debate over the legitimacy of affirmative action, I have
found it advances clarity to give independent attention to both
compensatory and egalitarian rationales, although in practice
they are often closely intertwined.
Some proponents and practitioners of affirmative action
adhere to a strong version of egalitarianism. They are interested
in equality of conditions and actual life chances, not simply
equality of abstract or nominal opportunity. For them, relevant
inquiries do not end with compensation for past wrongs nor are
they resolved by the adoption of facially neutral policies that
reproduce caste relations. On this view, inequalities in present
distribution have fairness implications in their own right, and
affirmative action is one way to alter these inequalities in a
progressive direction. The egalitarian impulse in affirmative
action is, of course, hardly supported by current Supreme Court
doctrine, which seldom sees distributional inequalities of race or
class as intrinsically problematic."' Further, such an approach
exists only in serious tension with familiar talk of affirmative
action as a "temporary" evil, and with the frequent usages that
suggest affirmative action to be a sort of one-time, dangerous,
regrettably necessary, exceptional adjustment to a system that
otherwise functions in a healthy way. But much of the actual
support for affirmative action flows from and is refreshed by
egalitarian traditions that see color-conscious programs as a
welcome aid to greater fairness now and in most imaginable
futures. These traditions seek a long-term commitment to
distributive equity, not simply a one-time, ostensibly curative

60. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 1, at 940 ("past and present race-based
economic inequality"), at 941 ("present and past 'societal discrimination'"), at 997
Cremediation of persistent race-based economic inequalities').
61. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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spasm after a discrete recognized wrong.6 2 These egalitarian
traditions call for education and employment to be more widely
accessible irrespective of the reasons for present disparities.
These traditions stress the importance of access to resources like
shelter, food, employment, education, transportation, medical
care, and information, both because of the importance of these
resources for individual survival and well-being, and because of
their impact on people's ability to participate meaningfully in
civic and political life.
4. PreventingSocial Disintegrationand Strife. There are two
strands of this affirmative action value: one utopian and the
other authoritarian. The utopian strand sees affirmative action
as one tool to help achieve a society where people feel themselves
to be members of a more or less cohesive, mutual community. In
such a community the social distance between people of different
races, classes, regions, genders, religions, ethnicities, sexual
orientations, languages, tax brackets, ages, and so on is relatively
small, and the possibilities for empathy, cooperation, and common
purpose are, therefore, relatively great. Aside from any unfairness to individuals that is associated with large social disparities
in wealth and power, this utopian strand emphasizes the harm to
society as a whole that results from allowing social divisions to
grow too large, and it stresses the benefits that could flow to
everyone from decisions and actions that diminish gross inequalities. At least for some, these kinds of arguments take on added
urgency in the face of growing disparities in wealth and income
in the United States. 3
A second strand of the social stability value is more authoritarian than utopian. It is less concerned with the characteristics
of and requirements for a good society and more concerned with
preserving the existing order, whatever it might be. Fears about

62. Note, by way of contrast, that one seldom hears the progressive income tax
described as a temporary evil that can and should be abandoned after one corrective
round. Although one could hardly describe our tax system as highly redistributive,
the income tax does contain some basically progressive structures. In this context,
we seem to have little trouble recognizing that power and resources tend to
reconcentrate themselves and that they will require regular, on-going adjustments
and redistributions against the "natural" drift that would occur without them.
63. See SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTTSCHALK, UNEVEN TIDES: RISING
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (1993); EDWARD N. WOLFF, ToP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE
INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA (1995); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A
BRIEF LOOK AT POSTWAR U.S. INCOME INEQUALITY (1996).
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possible black and brown rebellion have been a much more
important motivating factor in the widespread adoption of
affirmative action plans than many of us are comfortable
remembering. Race is given the importance it receives as an
affirmative action category at least in part because racial tension
threatens such serious disruption. For instance, I once heard
Professor Derrick Bell tell the story of how he came to take a
tenure-track position at Harvard Law School. As I remember, he
reported that decades ago, despite having had a successful
experience as a visiting teacher at Harvard, several inquiries he
made to the school about the possibility of gaining a permanent
position there were politely rebuffed. That is, they were politely
rebuffed until the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Within days of that event, he received a call from Harvard and
was urged to accept an offer to join the faculty. 4 Professor Bell
goes on to voice his firm conviction that political pressure from
students of color was a crucial element in his eventual winning of
tenure, that it affected official decisions at every key point.65
Professor Bell offered this story at a time of controversy over
affirmative action in hiring. I suppose you could say it was his
own contribution to what Professor Malamud and some others
call "the radical critique of merit."66
At my own law school, I once had an opportunity to witness
an appeal to the authoritarian strand of the social stability value.
One year, I served on our Admissions Committee. Two student
64. Some might say I am being too harsh or cynical in reading Harvard's offer
as an instance of the authoritarian strain, a step taken primarily with the aim of
maintaining order. I have no knowledge of the conversations that preceded the offer.
I do vividly recall that King's death made many white people and white institutions
highly anxious about the possibility that social unrest would be uncontainable. On
the other hand, his assassination genuinely saddened, alarmed, and outraged many
white people and white institutions as well, and the energy released by the event
spurred important reforms at myriad levels. His death changed the lives of many
individuals, both black and white.
65. Professor Derrick Bell, Jr., Remarks to Law Student Rally Protesting the
Lethargic Practice of Minority Faculty Hiring at Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
Mass. (Fall 1987). Bell has since left Harvard in protest over its continuing failure
to hire a single black woman to the faculty.
66. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 951. Malamud attributes her usage to
Daniel A. Farber &Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critiqueof Merit Anti-Semitic?,
83 CAL. L. REV. 853 (1995). See Malamud, supra note 1, at 951 n.37. I should note
here that I count myself a radical critic of merit as it is currently constructed by most
institutions of higher learning. However, I do not recognize much of my analysis in
the characterizations of Farber and Sherry nor in the descriptions of Professor
Malamud. (For Malamud's description, see supra note 1, at 951-64.)
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members were strongly opposed to affirmative action and viewed
their service on the committee as importantly dedicated to
fighting what they saw as a pernicious institutional practice. In
one memorable conversation about the topic, a faculty colleague
of mine spiritedly explained to these two that they simply lacked
the perspective to appreciate the wisdom of our efforts, and that
the program had been adopted as a salutary move in the important national project of preventing black revolution.
These stories are relevant for all of the beneficiaries of
affirmative action, a category which I take to encompass at least
all of us in legal education, including young white males and
white women like myself. These stories should remind us of the
debt we owe to the civil rights movement in all its restraint and
dignity and in all its ragged edges-to the praying clergy, singing
grandmothers, and fiery youth, to the brilliant strategists (sung
and unsung, male and female, high and low), to the ruly and
unruly brothers and sisters in the streets and in the jails, all of
whom raised the stakes in ways that could not be ignored.
Without them, for instance, we would not be witnessing the
exciting nascence of new and challenging legal scholarship about
matters of race, some of which is represented here in this
symposium. Without them, white faculty and white students in
colleges and universities and professional schools around the
country would not be presented with the rich if underused
opportunities for cross-race relationships and cross-race learning
that we now enjoy. Without them, substantially fewer attorneys
of color would now be representing clients or participating in the
solution of community problems, substantially fewer judges of
color would be deciding cases or educating their fellow jurists,
substantially fewer students at predominantly white colleges
would ever have the opportunity to study under a professor of
color, and substantially fewer physicians of color would be
treating patients, making hospital policy, or consulting on
research protocols.6 7 As we enjoy these benefits, we might remind
ourselves of the agitation and unrest that made them possible,
the signs that an impulse toward containment of social conflict is
one of the roots of affirmative action. 8

67. On the medical profession, see Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black
and HispanicPhysiciansin ProvidingHealth Carefor UnderservedPopulations,334
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1305 (1996).
68. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 20, at 11-32.
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5. Achieving Institutional Goals. Practitioners and promoters of affirmative action often justify these programs by showing
their value for the achievement of other institutional goals. For
instance, businesses often see affirmative action as helping them
attract a cosmopolitan customer base; police departments may see
affirmative action as helping them fight crime and improve the
image of the department in urban areas; and undergraduate
institutions see affirmative action as helping them to educate
white college students to work more competently in multicultural
environments. In legal education, of course, we are particularly
concerned with our job of educating future lawyers, constructing
the future bar, and producing legal scholarship. All of these aims
depend, in part, on our achieving a diverse faculty and student
body.
As Malamud points out, this justification has a disquietingly
instrumental flavor in some instances.69 This disquiet should
suggest caution to those concerned about racial justice. On the
other hand, the benefits of diversity for institutions can be
substantial, and reminders of these benefits can sometimes be an
important counterweight to the notion that affirmative action is
a zero sum handout to people of color at the expense of whites.
Setting out to build race-conscious affirmative action programs
oriented solely or primarily to the needs and interests of whites
is surely indefensible.70 But it would also be myopic to fail to
recognize the ways in which race-conscious affirmative action
programs well-designed to meet the needs of communities of color
could also provide substantial and important benefits to white
people and to historically white institutions. 1
6. Bestowing Charity upon the Non-threatening Poor. Although seldom explicitly articulated in the official descriptions of

69. See, e.g., Malamud, supranote 1, at 953 CIndividuals have no entitlements,
they have only uses.").
70. Nonetheless, some have said that the dominance of white interests in such
contexts is inevitable. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
71. The statement in the text is only part of the story, of course. Benefits of
well-built and well-administered race-conscious affirmative action programs flow
among and between groups of color as well, just as benefits of well-built and welladministered gender-conscious affirmative action programs flow to men as well as
to women. See, e.g., GABRIEL CHIN ET AL., BEYOND SELF-INTEREST: ASIAN PACIFIC
AMERICANS TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE, A POLICY ANALYSIS OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 2 (no date) available in http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/aasc/policy/txtonly/
index.html (visited Aug. 11, 1997); Yamamoto, supra note 20.
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affirmative action and its rationales, some of the discourse
surrounding affirmative action seems to presume that charitable
help for the humblest is the aim. This value fuels reactions
against the legendary child of the black neurosurgeon. It
surfaces, too, when voices are raised against academic support
programs that enable black students to improve their class
standing in ways that distribute them more evenly across the
student body rather than simply keeping them in school, albeit
clinging heavily at the bottom of the class. Some people feel
comfortable with programs that stress inclusion of the less
fortunate because that emphasis resonates with charitable
values, but they are uncomfortable with programs that seek to
advance students of color into the ranks of white students at a
level that produces new competition for resources that are
perceived as increasingly scarce.
This charity value resonates with many of the proposals for
affirmative action programs that are designed to benefit the
victims of "socioeconomic disadvantage." Holders of this value are
disturbed by hard-to-refute demonstrations that affirmative
action often works for the benefit of the "elite" within each
category of affirmative action recipients, rather than for the
benefit of those members of the category who have the greatest
need. Although some calls for class-based affirmative action
programs appeal to compensatory or redistributive goals, I believe
72
that most such calls have invoked the charitable impulse.
It is probably to be expected that in this country charity will
outweigh entitlement when matters of class are involved. The
U.S. legal system is notoriously anemic with regard to economic,
social, and cultural rights,73 and there is precious little law
suggesting that the disadvantages of class should be viewed as
compensable or avoidable wrongs rather than as personal
72. People involved with public and private American poverty programs have
not always been motivated or informed by notions of charity. Sometimes it is quite
the contrary. See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1973 (1993). Nevertheless, when Professor Malamud
observes that some arguments for class-based affirmative action presume that
affirmative action is an "anti-poverty program" rather than a compensatory one I
think she puts her finger on evidence of the charity value at work in affirmative
action discourse. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 948.
73. For instance, we have never ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See Barbara
Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and InternationalHuman Rights Law:
Toward an "EntirelyNew Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L. J. 79 (1992).
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misfortunes or even salutary, character-building challenges to
individual mettle. Further, the labor movement and other
movements representing the poor are in such a weak position at
present that they trigger little apprehension that class-based
affirmative action might "get out of hand." Although concern for
inclusion and uplift of the poor and victimized is in some instances relevant for affirmative action, advocates should be wary
of its influence in affirmative action debates for several reasons.
First, although paternalistic measures are in some contexts
appropriate, a signature danger of paternalism is that it will
recognize in the objects of its bounty their need for support, but
will fail to perceive and respect their capacities, talents, and
rights. This danger may pose a particular threat in the context
of efforts to desegregate schools and skilled jobs, because that
context is one where embedded white ideas about black
intellectual inferiority have regularly surfaced and have played
a potent and destructive part in confounding change.
Giving up strong reliance on the charitable impulse as a
justification for affirmative action may not constitute much of a
sacrifice in any event. As an openly espoused value that might
influence the allocation of substantial resources, public charity in
today's political climate appears to be approaching the vanishing
point.
Further, real suspicion is in order when those who say they
want to reform affirmative action because it unfairly disadvantages the poor and downtrodden are the same people who are
busy working to achieve and justify the destruction of the welfare
state.
The foregoing list of aims and values is undoubtedly incomplete. I offer it not to exhaust the field, but to suggest a more
complex set of choices that lie behind the development of affirmative action programs than Malamud's proposed polarity of
"economic inequality" versus "diversity" would imply. Each of
these values may have some relevance for her proposal regarding
affirmative action for middle-class African Americans. In another
context, it might be valuable to consider each in turn and its
implications for her thesis, but for now I leave that to readers, in
order to turn to a third and final criticism of Professor Malamud's
analysis.
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WHO SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO EDUCATION AND LIVELIHOOD?

Embedded in Professor Malamud's recommendation is an
uncontested norm of class hierarchy in higher education (and
perhaps in our highly segmented labor market as well). It may
be that Malamud is simply accepting that hierarchy as a given for
purposes of her argument here, aware that it may merit criticism
on another day or in another context, and forgoing comment until
that time. But before affirmative action proponents uncritically
embrace Malamud's argument, I believe they should examine the
assumptions that accompany it.
Malamud begins her essay by arguing that economic inequality offers a justification for affirmative action that is superior to
that of diversity. 4 It is no doubt obvious by now that I too
embrace the overcoming of economic inequality as a value, and I
too believe it remains a highly relevant indicator for assessing
both race-conscious and ostensibly race-blind distributions in our
society. I also agree that a compensatory rationale supports the
continued extension of the benefits of affirmative action to
middle-class black people who, whatever the class position of
their parents, have suffered racial harms. Some concept of just
desert and some reminder of past and enduring wrongs are moral
and political necessities for a right defense of affirmative action.
What disturbs me about Professor Malamud's move is not
what it says. In fact, some of her argument offers an excellent
corrective to recent attacks on race-conscious affirmative action.
Her analysis points, for instance, to an important problem with
the rhetoric of those calling for class-based affirmative action.
Many of these critics have deplored what they characterize as the
unfairness of extending privileges to relatively well-off black
applicants at the expense of the less fortunate,75 the latter often
represented in these arguments by iconographic figures such as

74. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 939-40.
75. For instance, one well-known critic of race-based affirmative action
remarked:
I think we need social policies that are committed to two goals: the
educational and economic development of disadvantaged people,
regardless of race, and the eradication from our society ...

of racial,

ethnic, or gender discrimination. Preferences will not deliver us to either
of these goals, since they tend to benefit those who are not
disadvantaged-middle-class white women and middle-class blacks-- and
attack one form of discrimination with another.
SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 124 (1990).
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the Appalachian coal miner's child, or an inner-city or barrio
youth. 76 Malamud points out with admirable clarity the comparison that is at work in such calls. Middle-class blacks are com-

pared with poor people of color or with poor whites. In this
portrayal, middle-class blacks occupy the pole of relative privilege, at least in socioeconomic terms. The implication is that they
are relatively less worthy of reward or help, and that any
privileges extended to them represent a moral failing of affirmative action. 7 Malamud argues that this contrast is the wrong one
to be making, that "the relevant economic comparison is between
the black middle class and the white middle class, rather than
between the black middle class and either the white or the black
poor."78 Malamud's argument brings the white middle class back
into the picture and forces us to compare its position and privilege
with that of its counterpart. In this second representation, of
course, the black middle class occupies the pole of relative
deprivation.
It is a nice move. At the moment of reading this passage, I
had the feeling of a curtain being drawn back, the truth of the
matter being revealed. It is unfair to cast middle-class blacks as
plunderers of those beneath them when their class position is
much more precarious and less privileged than their occupational
status or annual income might suggest to one familiar with class
patterns among white Americans. And it is unfair for relatively

76. When Clarence Thomas' appointment to the Supreme Court was in doubt,
one of his supporters, Senator Charles Robb, reported that "Judge Thomas has told
me that he supports certain types of affirmative action but that he doesn't believe
that his own son deserves preferential treatment over at a poor white child from
Appalachia. I find his views on the need to move to class-based remedies to help the
disadvantaged of all races intriguing and thoughtful." 137 CONG. REC. S14,669-01,
S14,688 (remarks of Sen. Charles S. Robb during Senate debate on nomination of
Judge Thomas).
Thomas himself, during his confirmation hearings, spoke approvingly about the
program that got him into Yale, pointing out that "[the program was aimed at]
socioeconomic disadvantage.., the kid could be a white kid from Appalachia, could
be a Cajun from Louisiana, or could be a black kid or a Hispanic kid from the inner
cities or from the barrios." Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Supreme
Court Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, Fed. News Service, Sept. 10-13, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File. (I should point out that the
accuracy of this description of Yale's program has been questioned. See Stuart
Taylor, Jr., The Road Beyond Racial Preferences,AM. LAW., Sept. 20, 1991, at 25.)
77. Note that the logic of the critics in this regard appears to be either that (1)
economic inequality entails compensable wrongs, or (2) affirmative action is about
bestowing charity on those most needy.
78. Malamud, supra note 1, at 949.
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privileged whites to distract attention from their own privilege
under the rhetoric of high-minded sympathy and concern for the
poor. Malamud's insistence that we compare apples to apples and
oranges to oranges feels tonic and reorienting at this juncture in
her argument, and I applaud her for it.
Yet, upon further reflection, it is this very turn that gives me
pause. Malamud's logic could be read to suggest that racial
justice has been achieved if every stratum of white society has a
corresponding and equivalently endowed stratum in communities
of color, if across racial lines, each class grouping enjoys like
privileges and benefits. It could be read to suggest that the
proper aim of affirmative action is to lift each respective class
sector within communities of color to the point where that sector
is as privileged (or as deprived or oppressed) as its white counterpart. This reading is reinforced when Malamud declares, "I
continue to support race-based affirmative action for what it is:
a program that benefits the black middle class."79
Affirmative action proponents should avoid promoting such
a template as an adequate vision of race or class justice. The
current crisis in affirmative action, precipitated in part by judicial
actions and inactions" and, in part, by the deteriorating racial
climate in the country,8" should propel us to press on with more
and different questions about the fairness of the educational
system, the efficacy and social consequences of the existing
testocracy, the life chances of Appalachian coal miners, of innercity and barrio youth, of welfare mothers now being pushed into
the lowest rungs of waged labor, and of the many different sorts
of Cheryl Hopwoods and Cipriana Herreras now struggling to
survive and prosper in our current political economy. We should
be seeking ways of establishing common cause with these people,
talking with them about the sorts of lawyers and lawyering they
79. Id. at 996. This characterization of the benefits of affirmative action is
limited in the extreme, and inaccurately so.
80. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
2581 (1996).

81. See, e.g., DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); STEPHEN STEINBERG,
TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND

POLICY (1995); Peter Applebome, Schools See Re-Emergence of "Separatebut Equal"
DesegregationEfforts Ending, Study Finds,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at A10; Center
for Democratic Renewal, Black Church Burnings in the South: Report of a Six
Month Preliminary Investigation (June 10, 1996) (available from the Center for
Democratic Renewal, Atlanta, Ga.).
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need, the sorts of doctors and doctoring they need, the nature of
the work they have and do not have, the kinds of education our
colleges and universities are providing, and for whom, and to
what ends.
None of these exhortations to a broader and more populist
defense of affirmative action are inconsistent with taking to heart
the good work that Malamud has done in describing the thoroughly racialized situation of the black middle class. None of it
denies that there is a special sort of equality rationale that
applies to that class in relation to its white counterpart. But it
suggests that there is a much bigger picture that should be
illuminated as well, a picture that includes a deeper set of harms
to the black middle class than those captured by comparing its
socioeconomic status to that of the white middle class, and a
picture that includes a wider group of people beyond the black
middle class who have a serious stake in a more democratic and
accessible work and educational environment.
Access to quality education and decent livelihood is scandalously limited and maldistributed in America, and is increasingly
difficult to achieve for those who are in the lower reaches of our
bifurcating labor force. A movement (or even an analysis) that
attempts to defend affirmative action while failing to raise this
point loudly and expansively lacks the moral authority, as well as
the much-needed allies, that a more generous vision could make
possible.
Accordingly, the strategy I believe we need is one that
questions not only the fairness of the treatment accorded the
black middle class in comparison with the treatment accorded the
white middle class. It is a strategy that calls for more probing
questions about the nature of the present educational establishment, and the proper aims of schooling in today's rapidly polarizing economy and polity. In the context of legal education, such a
strategy would strive to knit more affirmative action beneficiaries
with people "below" and "beside" them, rather than working to
bind them ever more inextricably and powerlessly to predominant
professional patterns, markets, and arrangements as they now
exist. It is a strategy that would seek to expand existing curricula and pedagogy so that the education we offer could better
equip more affirmative action beneficiaries to bring changes to
their (race and class) communities of origin and affinity, and
could better equip all interested students to play a role in
remedying the harms of past exclusions and disadvantages, racial
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and otherwise.
The insights and experiences of affirmative action pioneers
have played a crucial role in revealing the exclusionary and
privilege-reproducing nature of much legal education in the
United States. Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier recently characterized people of color and women in professional education as
serving a function similar to that of the "miners' canary," whose
demonstrable early distress in toxic air once provided crucial
warning to workers that the atmosphere underground was
growing dangerous for all.82 They argue that the experiences of
affirmative action hires and admits are importantly connected to
and illuminating of wider patterns of disadvantage and malfunction that are harmful to many other individuals and to legal
education as a whole. In other words, rather than referring back
to an existing unexamined norm by which to measure black
middle-class well-being, Sturm's and Guinier's analysis would
suggest that the lessons of affirmative action instruct us to
searchingly examine and question the norm itself.8" Through this

82. Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Miners' Canary (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). The authors note:
The impact of the testocracy on people of color tells more than a history
of racial exclusion. It also functions like a miners' canary, the bird
miners brought into the mine to signal the shift from fresh air to
poisonous gas. The canary is alerting us to a much larger problem in the
distribution of opportunity in higher education.
Id. at 1; see also Guinier & Sturm, supra note 17.
83. Extending this metaphor, Sturm and Guinier argue:
The solution... is not merely to fix the canary's respiratory system, to fit
the canary with a pint-sized gas mask, or to plead for special canary
rights but to clean the atmosphere that is poisoning us all.
The fresh air will begin to flow when we recognize that our current
testocracy creates a social oligarchy that stigmatizes those with less
privilege while it credentializes those with more....
We need to ask an entirely different set of questions that focus on
what we know about merit as a functional quality, not merely as a
testable quantity....
The Supreme Court's nonaction [in the Hopwood case] can enable a
long overdue conversation about higher education and democracy. In this
conversation affirmative action is not a backdoor but becomes instead a
window that allows us to see clearly the procession of social privilege now
strutting through the front door as if it were theirs by right. In this
conversation, we may discern uncomfortable similarities between the
contemporary testocracy and the past use of poll taxes, wealth
preferences or literacy tests. But as history has seen current, more
egalitarian notions of suffrage evolve, so may access to the front door of
higher education eventually be based on a commitment to functional
merit and democracy too.
Guinier & Sturm, The Miners' Canary,supra note 82, at 1-2.
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analysis they also point us toward strategic allies who have their
own stake in more widely accessible and useful educational
opportunities.
I welcome Professor Malamud's suggestive ideas for scrutinizing the intersectional characteristics of the black middle class.
I affirm her rejection of formal diversity as an adequate justification for affirmative action. But people who are interested in
preserving and moving beyond the important gains of this
century's civil rights movement should not settle for a type of
affirmative action that leaves class privilege and oppression
intact except when differences between white and non-white class
equivalents can be demonstrated. Such a calculus, standing
alone, is ill-suited even to detect the full spectrum of relevant race
and class relations. It is also likely to founder on difference in the
same way that previous antidiscrimination efforts keyed to white
or male norms have done.
Finally, such an approach is ill-suited for the building of a
broader movement for a more equitable distribution of educational and vocational opportunity, and such a movement is sorely
needed. A wide range of people in America have a stake in
preserving and strengthening democratic access to these important social sites, and affirmative action proponents should be
finding ways to talk to and move with greater numbers of them.

1034

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

